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 Responding to the Justice Gap
Migrant agricultural workers provide an essential and longstanding contribution to 
food security in Canada. Exploitation and rights shortfalls for these workers are well-
documented. On paper, they have rights on par with Canadian workers, but these 
rights do little to address the structure and dynamics underpinning their subordination 
in Canadian society. In this article, I argue that law creates a “justice gap” in the 
case of these workers. Law gives rights to these workers on an individual basis 
but also creates structural vulnerability which renders them unlikely to make use of 
individual remedies or compliance-based systems. Rights and protection discourse 
does not challenge the underlying institutional arrangements in which workers’ labour 
unfreedom is maintained. I argue that the justice gap can be understood as a rule of 
law problem, but that the utility of this approach is ultimately limited and direct action 
by workers is more likely to address justice issues.
Les travailleurs agricoles migrants apportent une contribution essentielle et de longue 
date à la sécurité alimentaire au Canada. L’exploitation et les lacunes en matière de 
droits de ces travailleurs sont bien documentées. Sur le papier, ils ont des droits 
équivalents à ceux des travailleurs canadiens, mais ces droits ne contribuent guère 
à régler le problème structurel et la dynamique qui sous-tendent leur subordination 
dans la société canadienne. Dans cet article, je soutiens que la loi crée un « vide 
juridique » dans le cas de ces travailleurs. La loi confère des droits à ces travailleurs 
sur une base individuelle mais crée également une vulnérabilité structurelle qui les 
rend peu susceptibles d’engager des recours individuels ou de s’appuyer sur des 
systèmes fondés sur le respect des dispositions législatives. Le discours sur les 
droits et la protection ne remet pas en question les arrangements institutionnels 
sous-jacents dans lesquels l’absence de liberté des travailleurs est maintenue. Je 
soutiens que le vide juridique peut être compris comme un problème de primauté du 
droit, mais que l’utilité de cette approche est en ﬁ n de compte limitée et que l’action 
directe des travailleurs est plus susceptible de régler les problèmes de justice.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University.  I would like to thank both 
the academic colleagues who reviewed this article and the editorial staff at the Dalhousie Law Journal 
for their excellent work.
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In response to the persistent critique of Canada’s temporary migrant labour 
programs, in 2016, a federal Standing Committee report heard evidence 
from workers, industry representatives, community organizations, and 
researchers on the use and impact of migrant labour in Canada. Among 
the recommendations to the federal government arising from this report 
are the following, of particular relevance to migrant agricultural workers:
• develop policy to prevent the use of temporary foreign workers to ? ll 
permanent labour shortages;
• “immediate steps” to remove the requirement for employer-speci? c 
work permits;
• the provision of multiple-entry work permits to seasonal migrant 
workers;
• review of permanent resident policy with a view to facilitating access 
to permanent residency for migrant workers who have integrated into 
Canadian society and are ? lling a permanent labour need; and
• improvement of employer monitoring and compliance regimes, 
including information sharing with provinces and the establishment of 
a dispute resolution mechanism for migrant workers.1
Two years after this report, the federal government had partially 
undertaken one of the above recommendations. The 2018 federal budget 
pledged $194.1 million to employer compliance and inspections over the 
? rst ? ve years, and $33.19 million per year thereafter to fund compliance 
and employer inspections. It also promised $3.4 million over two years 
to establish a pilot network of support organizations for migrant workers 
dealing with abuse from their employers, designed “to support these 
workers in reporting wrongdoing and provide information on their rights 
1.  House of Commons, Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills, and Social Development 
and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, ?????????????????? ????????????? (September 2016) at 
35-39 (Chair: Bryan May).
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to temporarily remain and work in Canada free from harassment and 
abuse.”2 There is no mention in budget, policy, or regulatory documents 
subsequent to the Standing Committee report of attempts to provide 
greater labour mobility to workers through the issuance of open or sector-
speci? c work permits rather than the current permits, which bind workers 
to an individual employer. Likewise, options for permanent residence for 
returning migrant agricultural workers, or those ? lling a permanent labour 
need, do not appear in any subsequent discussions. In addition to the 
regulatory exclusion of agricultural workers from permanent residence 
through their categorization as “low-skilled” workers,3 a 2017 Statistics 
Canada report con? rms that only 2% of seasonal agricultural workers 
eventually obtain permanent residence, while 56% of those entering 
through caregiving streams do transition to permanent residence.4 Unlike 
in past decades, policy discourse is now replete with the language of 
“rights” and “protection,” for migrant workers, and the federal government 
is allocating increased ? nancial resources to regulatory enforcement 
against employers and information sharing with the provinces. However, 
the federal government leaves out the two options that would most clearly 
address the structural concerns leading to the exploitation of migrant 
agricultural workers, namely the provision of pathways to permanent 
status and the removal of bonded work permits. The rights of migrant 
agricultural workers may be increasing, but this does not correspond to an 
increase in access to justice, because the underlying structure of migrant 
work programs functionally limits the use of individual rights. 
Canada has relied on the labour of agricultural workers through 
temporary migration since 1966, when the Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Program (SAWP) started. Unique among Canadian temporary 
work programs, the SAWP is founded on bilateral agreements between 
Canada and sending states. It started with an agreement between Canada 
and Jamaica in 1966 and grew to include Mexico as well as a group of 
other Caribbean countries represented by the Organization of Eastern 
2. House of Commons, Equality and Growth: A Strong Middle Class (February 2018) at 212 
(Minster: William Morneau), online (pdf): <budget.gc.ca/2018/docs/plan/budget-2018-en.pdf> 
[perma.cc/HPL8-JXRQ].
3. Sarah Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation of Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada” (2011) 
49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 39 at 41 [Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation”]; Judy Fudge & Fiona MacPhail, 
“The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada: Low Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of 
Flexible Labour” (2009) 31 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 5 at 11 (domestic workers are the exception to this, 
as they have in recent years been able to obtain permanent residence after a number of years of work).
4. Statistics Canada, Transition from Temporary Foreign Workers to Permanent Residents, 1990 
to 2014, by Yuqian Lu & Feng Hou, in Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Catalogue 
No 11F0019M-389 (Ottawa: Stats Can, 2017) at 8, online (pdf): <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/
pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2017389-eng.pdf?st=mgJJ9nsh> [perma.cc/V8PZ-LPA5].
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Caribbean States.5 Alongside dif? cult, dangerous working conditions, the 
racialization of workers has been endemic in this program since its origins, 
and remains prevalent.6 Most Canadian provinces receive migrant workers 
through SAWP, with the majority working in Ontario, Quebec, and British 
Columbia. Workers are permitted to stay in Canada for a maximum of 8 
months between January 1 and December 15 of the year for which they 
are hired. There is no limit on the number of years for which workers can 
return to Canada, and many do return for many years; in one study, 57% 
of Mexican workers returned for 6 years or more, and 22% returned for 
more than ten years.7 In addition to using SAWP, employers can also hire 
migrant agricultural workers through the Agricultural Stream for primary 
agriculture work in speci? ed agricultural commodities.8 The number of 
migrant agricultural workers is increasing: in 2017, the most recent year 
for which full data are available, a total of 48,185 migrant workers entered 
Canada through SAWP and the Agricultural Stream combined, which is 
almost double the number recorded in 2006.9 
Agricultural labour migration is one piece of a larger pattern in which 
temporary labour migration provides an increasingly large proportion of 
Canada’s workforce across multiple sectors and evidence that temporary 
migrant workers are meeting permanent labour market needs.10 Canada’s 
“general-purpose” temporary labour migration program, the Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), like the SAWP, is premised on 
5. The included countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica Grenada, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
6.  Leigh Binford & Kerry Preibisch, “Interrogating Racialized Global Labor Supply: Caribbean 
and Mexican Workers in Canada’s SAWP” in Leigh Binford, ed, Tomorrow We’re All Going to the 
Harvest: Temporary Foreign Worker Programs and Neoliberal Political Economy (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 2013) 93 at 95.
7.  Jenna Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary? Agricultural Migrant Workers and Their Integration 
in Canada” (2012) 26 Institute for Research on Public Policy 1 at 13, online (pdf): <irpp.org/wp-
content/uploads/assets/research/diversity-immigration-and-integration/permanently-temporary/IRPP-
Study-no26.pdf> [perma.cc/J9H7-ZLDV] [Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?”].
8.  Employment and Social Development Canada, Hire A Temporary Foreign Worker Through 
the Agricultural Stream (Overview) (Ottawa: ESDC, 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/employment-
social-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/agricultural.html> [perma.cc/RK5C-
A49Q].
9.  Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada—Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program (TFWP) work permit holders by province/territory of intended destination, program 
and year in which permit(s) became effective, January 2015–December 2018 (Dataset) (Ottawa: 
IRCC, 2017), online: <open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/360024f2-17e9-4558-bfc1-3616485d65b9?_
ga=2.64526252.2057289744.1521233311-1838033800.1501022758> [perma.cc/RWN6-XFK7].
10.  Karl Flecker, “Building a Disposable Workforce Through Temporary Migration Policy” (2010) 
Can Issues/Themes Can 99; Patti Tamara Lenard & Christine Straehle, eds, Legislated Inequality: 
Temporary Labour Migration in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012); Kerry 
Cundal & Brian Seaman, “Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Programme: A Discussion of Human 
Rights Issues” (2012) 9:3 Migration Letters 201.
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workers’ temporary presence in Canada, requires employer endorsement, 
and uses work permits that are bonded to a speci? c job and employer. 
The TFWP is used across various labour segments in Canada, from 
upper-level white collar work to retail, food service, primary industry, 
and construction. Workers classi? ed as “high skilled” generally have 
more reliable pathways to permanent residence and family reuni? cation 
than those classi? ed as “low skilled.”11 The number of workers admitted 
under the TFWP continues to outstrip the number of permanent economic 
immigrants to Canada, and those classi? ed as “low-skilled” constitute 
a growing proportion of total migrant workers in what Judy Fudge and 
Fiona MacPhail call an “extreme form of ? exible labour.”12 Nandita 
Sharma has also documented racialization in the TFWP generally as a 
mechanism of constituting “others” as part of a nationalist discourse in 
Canada.13 The TFWP and the SAWP share structural features ? owing 
from the legal regulation of migrant work, and in particular the limitation 
of labour mobility and capacity to remain in Canada. The SAWP can be 
seen as the most extreme extension of federal policies which emphasize 
temporariness and exaggerate the power differential between worker and 
employer. All TFWP workers are time-limited, but SAWP workers are 
seasonal; all TFWP workers need an employer to endorse their permit, but 
employers have a stronger role in program determination in SAWP. Added 
to this dynamic is the geographic and cultural isolation of agricultural 
work in rural Canada and the occupational hazards associated with farm 
labour, further increasing the risk to workers in SAWP particularly. In this 
paper, while I focus on the SAWP speci? cally as one of the two programs 
in which migrant workers are most vulnerable (the other being domestic 
work), the analysis that follows is applicable to some degree to the TFWP 
as well, and in particular to low-skilled workers in that program. 
Agricultural workers in general, including migrant workers, do not 
have access to standard protections of the unionization process and formal 
collective action through labour law in Ontario, as they are subject to a 
separate regime.14 In British Columbia, where they are not excluded 
11.  Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation,” ????? note 3 at 45.
12.  Fudge & MacPhail, ??????note 3 at 43. 
13.  Nandita Sharma, ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????? ?????
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 4.
14.  For a detailed treatment of the exclusion of agricultural workers from Ontario labour law, see 
Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? (Toronto: Irwin, 2012).
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from labour law, unionization efforts have been fraught with dif? culty.15
In addition to the problems arising within the employment relationship, 
researchers have established the long-term negative impacts of the SAWP 
program on migrant participants, including family estrangement16 and 
long-term health problems.17 Weiler and McLaughlin have documented 
the impact of SAWP participation on food security for migrant workers, 
demonstrating the multiple barriers that arise for workers who live in 
Canada without access to adequate kitchen and food storage facilities or 
access to fresh, affordable food; ironically so, given their role in providing 
food security to Canada.18 Migrant workers under these programs are 
exclusively nationals of Mexico and the Caribbean, and workers are 
racialized within Canada’s programs.19 
The substandard living and working conditions often faced by 
migrant agricultural workers in Canada are well-documented, including 
unliveable employer-supplied housing, inadequate cooking and sanitation 
facilities, occupational health and safety problems,20 wage theft, unlawful 
termination, barriers to accessing health care,21 and racist and sexualized 
harassment and abuse on the job.22 Workers sometimes pursue complaint-
based remedies or engage in other forms of resistance that do not rely 
on the legal system, but the ready threat of deportation and non-renewal 
of permits functions to increase worker compliance through what Basok 
and Belanger call “performances of self-discipline.”23 It is important 
15. Leah F Vosko, “Blacklisting as a modality of deportability: Mexico’s response to circular migrant 
agricultural workers’ pursuit of collective bargaining rights in British Columbia, Canada” (2016) 42:8 
J of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1371.
16.  Janet McLaughlin et al, “Temporary Workers, Temporary Fathers: Transnational Family Impacts 
of Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program” (2017) 72:4 Industrial Relations 682.
17.  Kerry Preibisch & Jenna Hennebry, “Temporary migration, chronic effects: The health of 
international migrant workers in Canada” (2011) 183:9 CMAJ 1033.
18.  Anelyse M Weiler, Janet McLaughlin & Donald C Cole, “Food Security at Whose Expense? 
A Critique of the Canadian Temporary Farm Labour Migration Regime and Proposals for Change” 
(2017) 55:4 Intl Migration 4.
19.  Kerry Preibisch & Leigh Binford, “Interrogating Racialized Global Labour Supply: An 
Exploration of the Racial/National Replacement of Foreign Agricultural Workers in Canada” 
(2007) 44:1 Can Rev Sociology 5. See also Nandita Sharma, “On Being Not Canadian: The Social 
Organization of “Migrant Workers” in Canada” (2001) 38:4 Can Rev Sociology 415.
20.  Janet McLaughlin, Jenna Hennebry & Ted Haines, “Paper versus Practice: Occupational Health 
and Safety Protections and Realities for Temporary Foreign Agricultural Workers in Ontario” (2014) 
16:2 Perspectives interdisciplinaires sur le travail et la santé 1.
21.  Jenna Hennebry, Janet McLaughlin & Kerry Preibisch, “Out of the Loop: (In)access to Health 
Care for Migrant Workers in Canada” (2016) 17:2 J Intl Migration & Integration 521.
22.  Kerry Preibisch & Gerardo Otero, “Does Citizenship Status Matter in Canadian Agriculture? 
Workplace Health and Safety for Migrant and Immigrant Laborers” (2014) 79:2 Rural Sociology 174.
23. Tanya Basok & Daniele Belanger, “Migration Management, Disciplinary Power, and 
Performances of Subjectivity: Agricultural Migrant Workers in Ontario” (2016) 41:2 Can J Sociology 
139 at 141.
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not to understate workers’ successes and meaningful acts of resistance 
both within and outside legal remedies. However, the subordination of 
migrant workers as a group has remained a structural feature of migrant 
work programs in Canada. As I revisit in detail below, temporary status, 
deportability, and labour immobility, including employers’ power to 
in? uence the selection of workers’ opportunities to return underpin the 
subordination of workers.24 This disjuncture arising from the operation of 
law on multiple levels gives rise to a justice gap: not only a gap between 
migrant workers and citizen workers, but a gap between the promise of 
law and its actual functioning.
A patchwork of laws apply to migrant workers in general, although 
agricultural and domestic workers have been subject to particular 
exceptions, notably with regard to basic employment standards in some 
provinces.25 In large part, however, migrant agricultural workers are de 
jure equal to citizen workers with regard to the protection of basic working 
conditions and other formal rights, but the legal institutional features of 
migrant work programs create conditions under which workers’ capacity 
to obtain remedies is undermined, or the available remedies are inadequate 
given the differences between migrant and citizen workers, leading to de 
facto exclusion. Employment standards, labour, and occupational safety 
regimes tend to have no self-re? exivity in this regard—the justice gap is 
not visible within structures in which workers are implicitly assumed to 
have citizenship. An exception to this is found in provincial human rights 
law in Canada, in which there has recently been a turn toward the analysis 
of the structural features of migrant work programs that create workers 
vulnerability and the relationship between migration status and grounds 
such as sex and race, for which human rights law provides protection 
against discrimination.26 Despite this, the promise of individual remedies 
24. Jill Lindsay Harrison & Sarah E Lloyd, “Illegality at Work: Deportability and the Productive 
New Era of Immigration Enforcement” (2012) 44:2 Antipode 365. See also Tanya Basok, Danièle 
Bélanger & Eloy Rivas, “Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-western 
Ontario” (2014) 40:9 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 1394.
25.  See, e.g., Industries and jobs with exemptions or special rules, 4 January 2019, online: Ontario 
Ministry of Labour Exemptions Tool <www.ontario.ca/document/industries-and-jobs-exemptions-
or-special-rules> [perma.cc/7CFP-64G3] (in 2018, an overhaul of employment standards legislation 
brought domestic workers within full coverage of the Employment Standards Act for the ? rst time).
Agricultural workers in British Columbia are exempt from several standard protections: see Farm 
Workers Factsheet, July 2016, online: British Columbia Employment Standards <www2.gov.bc.ca/
gov/content/employment-business/employment-standards-advice/employment-standards/factsheets/
farm-workers> [perma.cc/VJJ9-WHAT].
26. See, e.g., CSWU Local 1611 v SELI Canada Ltd, 2008 BCHRT 436; T(OP) v Presteve Foods 
Ltd, 2015 HRTO 675 at para 216; Monrose v Double Diamond Acres Ltd, 2013 HRTO 1273; PN v FR, 
2015 BCHRT 60 at para 92; Ben Saad v 1544982 Ontario Inc, 2017 HRTO 1.
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is normalized in Canadian food production and enacted through law and 
policy despite a recent turn to more rights talk.33 Rights and enforcement 
talk is increasingly present in public and policy discourse with regard to 
migrant workers in Canada. But both rights and enforcement frameworks 
tend to frame workers and employers as isolated individuals. Through 
well-functioning rights mechanisms, the worker becomes eligible for an 
individual remedy based on the harm they can establish to themselves 
personally, and the employer is named as a wrongdoer, with the implicit 
assumption that the employer is an outlier.34 In enforcement mechanisms, 
as well, individual employers are named publicly and subject to sanction. 
Neither of these methods leaves room for examining or challenging the 
conditions under which unfree labour becomes structurally embedded, 
nor for examining “the role of states—especially through labour and 
immigration policy—in fostering conditions in which the most severe 
forms of exploitation can thrive.”35
In the following section, I will map the basic legal rights of migrant 
agricultural workers and their limits in terms of the structural regulation 
of migrant labour, before turning to consider whether the “justice gap” 
thereby created can be addressed by a rule of law argument.
 II.? ???????????????????????
A patchwork of laws provides rights to migrant agricultural workers 
in Canada, and while the array of remedies available varies between 
jurisdiction, I will use examples from Ontario and British Columbia. This 
section will provide a brief map of rights and entitlements for migrant 
workers, including remedies and the few available reported cases. While 
there is room for improvement in the individual rights of migrant workers, 
those workers are by and large included in the basic employment, human 
rights, and housing standards provided by law to all workers. In other 
words, the justice gap cannot be attributed to a failure to include migrant 
workers in standard workplace protections.
Seasonal agricultural work programs form a standalone stream of 
temporary migrant labour in Canada, based on bilateral agreements 
between Canada and Mexico, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, 
33.  Weiler, McLaughlin & Cole??????? note 18. See also Adrian A Smith, “Racialized in Justice: The 
Legal and Extra-Legal Struggles of Migrant Agricultural Workers in Canada” (2013) 31 Windsor YB 
Access Just?15.
34.  Jenna Hennebry, “Not Just a Few Bad Apples: Vulnerability, Health, and Temporary Migration 
in Canada” (2010) Can Issues/Themes Can?73?
35. Genevieve LeBaron, “Unfree Labour Beyond Binaries” (2015) 17:1 Intl Feminist J of Politics 1 
at 2.
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and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.36 The legal status of 
these agreements is not that of a treaty, but rather an “intergovernmental 
administrative arrangement” for mutual bene? t under which parties 
undertake to resolve disputes through consultation.37 The agreements state 
that workers are to receive “fair and equitable treatment while in Canada 
under the auspices of the Program” in the case of Caribbean workers38
and “adequate accommodation and treatment equal to that received by 
Canadian workers performing the same type of agricultural work, in 
accordance with Canadian laws” in the case of Mexican workers. Employers 
are not directly bound by this as they are not parties to the agreement. 
However, standard form contracts for workers are attached as appendices 
to the bilateral agreements, and spell out workers’ and employers’ rights 
and obligations, and are intended to be signed by workers, employers, 
and a consular agent of the sending government. The Mexican contract 
includes a standard working day of 8 hours, with voluntary paid overtime 
and a limit on “excessive hours that would be detrimental to (workers’) 
health and safety”39 and overtime requests should be made “giving the 
same rights to Mexican workers as given to Canadian workers.”40 Workers 
must be given two breaks of ten minutes during the day, paid or unpaid 
according to provincial legislation, as well as one day off after six working 
days.41 Workers are entitled to pay for 40 hours per week at either the 
minimum wage, the prevailing wage according to ESDC, or the rate paid 
to Canadian workers, whichever is greater (except BC, which uses a piece 
rate, in which workers are paid by the weight of the fruit they pick, with 
the minimum wage as the ? oor).42 The contract provides that employers 
may terminate workers for “non-compliance, refusal to work, or any other 
suf? cient reason stated in this agreement” (except in British Columbia).43
Employers must provide “suitable accommodation” to workers 
without cost (except in British Columbia, where they may charge for 
36. Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?,” supra note 7 at 9.
37. Veena Verma, “The Regulatory and Policy Framework of the Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Program” (2017) North-South Institute 1 at 5, online (pdf): <s3.amazonaws.com/migrants_
heroku_production/datas/149/Verma_2007_original.pdf?1311694811> [perma.cc/E7ML-DK82].
38. Ibid at 7.
39. Employment and Social Development Canada, Contract for the Employment in Canada of 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers from Mexico—2019 (Ottawa: ESDC, 2018), s I.3, online: <www.
canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/seasonal-
agricultural/apply/mexico.html> [perma.cc/GX9K-U372].
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid, s II(11-12).
42. Ibid, s III(5-7).
43. Ibid, s X(2).
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it) and subject to annual inspection by a health authority.44 In addition 
to provincial reporting requirements for occupational injury, employers 
must also report to the sending consulate any injuries requiring medical 
attention45 and provide protective gear and equipment to workers handling 
chemicals and pesticides.46 Similarly, employers must provide records of 
hours and wages to the sending consulate.47 The SAWP contract purports 
to bind workers to reside at the place of employment or otherwise, at the 
whim of the employer,48 and to “return promptly” to their country of origin 
upon completion of the work permit.49 The Caribbean contract is similar in 
content, with minor variations.50
The SAWP agreements are contracts of employment between 
individual workers and employers, and could thus be enforceable in any 
Canadian court, but to date there are no published decisions in which 
either a worker or an employer has sought to enforce their terms. Some 
terms seem to invite judicial clari? cation. For example, the concept of 
‘suf? cient reason’ for termination appears to deviate from the commonly 
accepted standard of ‘just cause’ for termination in employment law. Is this 
language intended to make it easier to terminate workers, and if so, would 
judges countenance the application of a separate standard for migrant 
agricultural workers? Likewise, the contract includes terms allowing the 
employer to determine where the worker will reside and obligating the 
worker to return to their home country, both of which seem to obligate 
speci? c performance beyond the employment relationship: again, would 
such terms be seen as enforceable, or unconscionable, under Canadian 
employment law? As I will elaborate below, it is no accident that these 
terms have remained judicially unexamined, but on the face of it, there 
is nothing to suggest that migrant agricultural workers are excluded from 
standard common law for unfair termination of limited duration contracts, 
breach of terms, or unconscionability available to all workers; in some 
44. Ibid, s II(2).
45. Ibid, s V(5).
46. Ibid, s VIII(3)(b).
47. Ibid, s VU(1).
48. Ibid, s IX(6).
49. Ibid, s IX(4).
50. Employment and Social Development Canada, Contract for the Employment in Canada of 
Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers—2019 (Ottawa: ESDC, 2018), online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/
seasonal-agricultural/apply/caribbean.html> [perma.cc/GX9K-U372].
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situations, migrant workers may also have recourse to tort claims for 
breach of ? duciary duty.51
In addition to the common law of employment, Canadian law offers 
statutory minimum standards of employment in every province and 
territory, providing a minimum wage, basic overtime and leave provisions, 
and prohibition of unauthorized payroll deductions, among others. 
Migrant agricultural workers are included in some, but not all, of these 
protections, at least in British Columbia and Ontario. In British Columbia, 
farm workers (including both citizens and migrants) are excluded from 
overtime pay provisions, meal break requirements, minimum hours free 
from work, and statutory holiday pay52 although they remain protected 
from excessive hours, or hours detrimental to the worker’s health and 
safety.53 While their wages are determined by piecework rates based 
on weight, they are entitled to at least minimum wage no matter how 
much they pick, and they are entitled to regular wage statements and 
timely pay, vacation pay, and protection from unauthorized deductions 
and fees for job placement, as well as a basic level of compensation for 
termination without cause.54 The situation is similar in Ontario: harvesters 
in fruit, vegetable, and tobacco are excluded from caps on hours of work, 
mandatory rest periods, meal breaks, overtime, and statutory holiday 
pay. They remain entitled to termination pay, timely pay statements, 
and protection from unauthorized deductions. With regard to minimum 
wage, there is somewhat less protection, as employers can bene? t from 
‘deemed compliance’ with minimum wage rules where workers are paid a 
piece rate under which the worker’s ‘reasonable effort’ would amount to 
minimum wage, even if the employee does not actually receive minimum 
wage.55 Any worker in Ontario pursuant to a temporary work permit 
program, including migrant agricultural workers, is entitled to additional 
protections under the Employment Protections For Foreign Nationals 
Act.56 This prohibits employers from taking passports from workers, from 
charging workers for employment costs, from reprisal against workers 
for complaints, and it requires employers to provide rights information 
51. See Mustaji v Tjin, 25 BCLR (3rd) 220, 128 WAC 178. See also Espinoza v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2013 ONSC 1506, in which the Superior Court of Ontario held that the worker had an action 
for wrongful dismissal but made no decision on the merits of that action.
52. Employment Standards Regulation, BC Reg 396/95, s 34(1).
53. Ibid, s 34(1); Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 39 [BC ESA].
54. BC ESA, supra note 53, ss 10, 21, 27, 57, 63.
55. Exemptions, Special Rules, and Establishment of Minimum Wage, O Reg 285/01, s 25(2).
56. Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), SO 2009, c 
32.
???????? ???????????????????????????????????? ???
to workers in an appropriate language if they do not speak English.57 All 
of these statutes rely on workers to initiate a complaint, as do all similar 
employment standards laws across Canada.
In terms of occupational health and safety, migrant agricultural workers 
are generally included as workers: in British Columbia, for example, 
there is no distinction based on migration status in the legislation, and 
these workers can make compensation claims for injury and occupational 
disease, as well as making complaints about unsafe working conditions. 
In the case of compensation claims, employers and employees both have 
an obligation to report workplace injuries resulting in lost time or medical 
attention. Occupational health and safety issues rely on workers’ reports, 
which migrant workers may be less likely to make given the stakes of 
job loss and deportation. In some cases, the outcome for migrant workers 
in terms of workers’ compensation is categorically diminished, due in 
particular to the logic underlying loss of earnings assessments. For example, 
a migrant worker’s losses would be calculated (and reduced) based on the 
assumption that the worker could obtain suitable alternate employment in 
Ontario, even when such employment was legally impossible (due to the 
ending of a work permit and repatriation of the worker). This logic has 
recently been overturned in an Ontario appeal tribunal decision, which 
held that the worker’s local labour market in their country of origin is the 
appropriate context in which to assess loss of earnings.58
Seasonal agricultural workers, like all workers, are also entitled to 
seek compensation for loss of earnings and injury to dignity on the basis 
of discriminatory conduct by an employer under human rights law. While 
neither seasonal agricultural workers nor migrant workers in general have 
been recognized as a protected group under human rights legislation,59
tribunals are increasingly willing to recognize the particular context of 
migrant workers in fashioning remedies. In the only published example 
of a human rights decision concerning a migrant agricultural worker, the 
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal heard a claim from a migrant agricultural 
worker who was terminated from his position and repatriated after 
complaining about racial slurs from the employer. The Tribunal received 
expert academic evidence on the unique vulnerabilities of migrant 
workers and the connection between fear of deportation and workers’ 
reluctance to report workplace concerns, and considered the particular 
57. Ibid, ss 8, 11.
58. Decision No 1773/17, 2017 ONWSIAT 2962.
59. “Migration status” has been rejected as a basis for protection under s 15 of the Charter (Toussaint 
v Canada (MCI), 2011 FCA 213), while “citizenship” is accepted (Andrews v Law Society of British 
Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1).
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vulnerability of workers in this program in issuing a remedy.60 While 
human rights remedies consist primarily of compensation for injury to 
dignity and lost wages, they may also include reinstatement or other job-
speci? c remedies.61 For migrant workers, a reinstatement remedy could be 
complicated by the lack of labour mobility—if they no longer have a valid 
work permit under federal law, a reinstatement order would be frustrated. 
Human rights remedies in both Ontario and British Columbia are based 
entirely on complainant-initiated processes, and despite the availability of 
compensation for employer retaliation, this, like other remedies, does not 
account for deportability and lack of labour mobility.
Agricultural migrant workers are required to live on the farms where 
they work, or in other housing under the control of their employers, and 
concerns with unsafe and inadequate housing are well-documented.62
There are multiple sources of law which could be used to deal with housing 
concerns, the ? rst of which is the employer’s requirement to provide 
‘suitable’ housing in the SAWP contract itself, and the attendant annual 
inspections. While annual inspections do not require worker complaint, 
the results may not re? ect the actual living conditions of workers, due, for 
example, to relocation of workers by the employer to avoid the impression 
of overcrowding in advance of inspections. In addition, workers who 
pay rent could have recourse to residential tenancy protections, such as 
those available through the Residential Tenancy Act in British Columbia.63
These include basic maintenance and sanitation standards, as well as 
privacy from the employer/landlord. There are no published decisions in 
which a seasonal agricultural worker has used residential tenancy law. 
Once again, the process is complaint based, and damages can be limited: 
while punitive awards are possible, often the only compensation is for rent 
paid, which is minimal for these workers.64 Finally, some provinces have 
speci? c laws regulating the use of “work camp” style accommodation 
60. Monrose v Double Diamond Acres Limited, 2013 HRTO 1273.
61. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 45.2; Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 37.
62. See Adrian Smith, “The Bunk House Rules: A Materialist Approach to Legal Consciousness 
in the Context of Migrant Workers’ Housing in Ontario” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 863. See also 
Patricia Tomic, Ricardo Trumper & Luis LM Aguiar, “Housing Regulations and Living Conditions 
of Mexican Migrant Workers in the Okanagan Valley, BC” (2010) Can Issues/Themes Can 78; 
Mervyn Horgan & Sara Liinamaa, “The Social Quarantining of Migrant Labour: Everyday Effects of 
Temporary Foreign Worker Regulation in Canada” (2017) 43:5 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 713.
63. Residential Tenancy Act, SBC 2002, c 78.
64. Migrant workers (non-agricultural) have attempted to use human rights legislation to obtain 
compensation for substandard housing, on facts in which discrimination was established with regard 
to employment. Chein v Tim Hortons Inc, 2015 BCHRT 169. On the facts of the case, the complaint 
with regard to housing was denied by the BCHRT, but remains a possible basis for compensation 
where discrimination in housing could be proven.
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in which employers who violate the ESA and are caught can expect that 
in most cases the worst that will happen is that they will be required to 
pay what they owe.”68 Furthermore, she notes, the risks to workers of 
initiating a complaint “are shaped by the social location of the claimants,” 
giving the example of migrant workers whose permits are tied to a speci? c 
employer, and who therefore fear loss not only of employment, but of their 
status in Canada, as reprisal for making complaints against an employer.69
While Vosko’s ? eldwork was speci? c to the employment standards 
context, these arguments are equally applicable to the procedurally similar 
mechanisms attached to human rights, housing, and occupational health 
and safety complaints, and the risk to workers in terms of reprisal would 
be indistinguishable as between statutes. Even for those statutes in which 
there is compensation for employer reprisal, this would be cold comfort to 
a worker deprived of their livelihood, or their migration status. 
In addition to problems with compliance-based systems for workers 
at large, other areas of Canadian law contribute to the unequal position of 
migrant workers and effectively undermine the potential of rights remedies. 
The federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and its regulations 
create a taxonomy of status and structural employment vulnerabilities for 
migrant workers against which even the most inclusive of rights remedies 
are limited at best. Deportability is a part of this; workers who are temporary 
face a risk of removal, because they are in Canada as a matter of privilege, 
not a matter of right, as compared to permanent residents and citizens.70 The 
stakes are therefore not only higher, but of a completely different nature. 
For migrant agricultural workers speci? cally, there is also a real risk of not 
being retained or recalled to work in subsequent seasons, otherwise known 
as “blacklisting,” a disciplining response in which the government of 
Mexico has also been complicit as a sending state. In her detailed account 
of actual blacklisting in agricultural work, Leah Vosko documents both 
threats of blacklisting and acts of blacklisting by employers and Mexican 
consular of? cials in response to unionization efforts. Blacklisting as a 
form of deportability effectively limits the exercise of labour rights by 
workers, but also serves the interests of employers and both state parties 
in maintaining the status quo: a “model” migration program in a “climate 
68. Leah F Vosko et al, “The Compliance Model of Employment Standards Enforcement: An 
Evidence-based Assessment of its Ef? cacy in Instances of Wage Theft” (2017) 48:3 Industrial 
Relations J 256 at 270.
69. Ibid at 264. See also Fay Faraday, Pro? ting from the Precarious: How Recruitment Practices 
Exploit Migrant Workers (Toronto: Metcalf Foundation, 2014).
70. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 11, 29 [IRPA].
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of fear” is institutionalized for workers.71 Compounding the vulnerability 
engendered by deportability is the closed work permit system: based on a 
protectionist policy impulse, migrant workers are limited to working for a 
single employer (unless they have that employer’s support to move), in a 
single position, and therefore lack basic labour mobility.72 These workers 
provide unfree labour in contrast to citizen workers, permanent residents, 
and open work permit holders.73 Researchers have also explicated how 
status precariousness is institutionalized in immigration law, as it is easy to 
lose status, and dif? cult to maintain or restore it.74 Finally, immigration law 
creates a distinction between “high-skilled” and “low-skilled” workers; 
the former have access to permanent residence, family accompaniment, 
and family reuni? cation, whereas the latter generally do not.75
In the case of migrant agricultural workers speci? cally, the legal 
limitations on labour mobility and migration status exist to provide 
stability in labour supply for food production and remittances to sending 
countries, and are established through long-term bilateral agreements for 
the movement of labour. As many others have noted, the very features of 
the legal arrangements which make migrant workers desirable as a stable, 
? exible work force in food production serve as strong disincentives to 
the pursuit of individual rights-based remedies. Risks of deportation, non-
recall, and loss of income are simply not accounted for in rights remedies 
because the necessity of temporary, ? exible labour is naturalized in 
Canadian and global political economy. While it is important to recognize 
the individual victories of workers and their advocates in using rights-
based protections, the resulting gains should not be overstated in assessing 
the role and potential of law; it is an example of situation in which rights 
exist but “the framework is not compatible with the problem.”76 The 
71. United Mexican States v British Columbia (Labour Relations Board), 2015 BCCA 32; Leah 
Vosko, “Blacklisting as a Modality of Deportability: Mexico’s Response to Circular Migrant 
Agricultural Workers’ Pursuit of Collective Bargaining Rights in British Columbia, Canada” (2016) 
42:8 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 1371 at 1382.
72. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 203 [IRPR].
73. See Aziz Choudry & Adrian A Smith, eds, Unfree labour? Struggles of Migrant and Immigrant 
Workers in Canada (San Francisco: PM Press, 2016). See also Kendra Strauss & Siobhán McGrath, 
“Temporary Migration, Precarious Employment and Unfree Labour Relations: Exploring the 
‘Continuum of Exploitation’ in Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program” (2017) 78 Geoforum 
199.
74. Luin Goldring, Carolina Berinstein & Judith K Bernard, “Institutionalizing Precarious Migratory 
Status in Canada” (2009) 13:3 Citizenship Studies 239.
75. Sarah Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation of Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada” (2011) 
49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 39.
76. Sally Merry, “Inequality, Gender Violence, Human Rights” in Simon Archer, Daniel Drache & 
Peer Zumbansen, eds, The Daunting Enterprise of Law: Essays in Honour of Harry Arthurs (Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017) at 302.
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liberal gesture is pervasive—the language of equity, protection, and rights 
appears in the bilateral agreement between governments, the workers’ 
contract, and the multiple protections to which workers have de jure 
recourse—but, without a substantive linking of these three sources of law 
and their underlying political economy, rights statutes alone are ineffective 
in improving the material conditions of workers in a systemic way.77 The 
federal government’s recent response to ongoing rights shortfalls in the 
migrant worker program has as its centrepiece a new enforcement and 
compliance system, to which I will turn in the next section.
 III. Enforcement against employers
In 2015, Canada’s federal government made changes to the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulations in which speci? c workplace rights 
were linked with the migrant labour program for the ? rst time. Until 
recently, the federal government disclaimed responsibility for protecting 
migrant workers because employment standards were a matter of provincial 
jurisdiction. Short of actually breaching the Act or Regulations, for example 
by hiring unauthorized workers, employers were not accountable within 
the prior framework for the treatment or working conditions of migrant 
workers; under previous regulations, employers’ responsibility was 
limited to compliance with the conditions speci? ed in the labour market 
assessments under which they had hired workers. Compliance checks were 
undertaken only for returning employers, evidence was sought primarily 
from employers, and remedies were focused on ‘education’ of employers, 
rather than deterrence.78 
The new compliance and enforcement system is much more 
extensive in both scope and remedy. Employers of all migrant workers 
with employer-tied work permits are now also required to comply with 
“federal and provincial laws that regulate employment, and the recruiting 
of employees,”79 which clearly includes provincial employment standards 
and occupational health and safety laws, and arguably also includes 
the sections of provincial human rights laws that apply speci? cally to 
employment. However, the mention of provincial standards does not 
mean that federal agencies will enforce provincial standards. Instead, 
federal sanctions are triggered once a provincial agency (such as the 
77. Daiva K Stasiulis, “International Migration, Rights, and the Decline of ‘Actually Existing 
Liberal Democracy’” (1997) 23:2 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 197.
78. Employment and Social Development Canada, Integrity Operations Manual—Chapter 63—
Temporary Foreign Worker Compliance Reviews (Ottawa: ESDC, 2013) at 4. This document was 
provided on request under the Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1.
79. IRPR, supra note 72, s 209.2(1)(ii).
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British Columbia Employment Standards Branch) has completed its 
process and found an employer in breach of employment standards. In 
effect, employers of migrant workers found in breach of provincial 
standards may face additional penalties federally. Employers must also 
“make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace free of abuse,” with 
abuse de? ned as including physical, sexual, psychological, and ? nancial 
abuse.80 The scope of investigative power is also signi? cantly expanded: 
rather than simply requesting documentary evidence, federal agents can 
question employers, conduct on-site inspections, and enter workplaces 
without a warrant, triggered by a “reason to suspect” the employer is non-
compliant.81 Inspections can be based on public (or worker) complaints 
through tip lines, on the employer’s previous record, or based on random 
selection; by some reports, there is already backlash from agricultural 
employers in response to compliance inspections.82 Consequences for 
noncompliant employers include monetary penalties of up to $100,000, 
ineligibility periods in which migrant workers cannot be hired (up to a 
permanent ban) and online publication of the employer’s name and 
noncompliance.83 Based on numbers provided by the responsible federal 
agencies, thousands of inspections are undertaken annually. As of 1 April 
2018, a total of 50 employers had been subject to penalties under this 
regime, of which 26 were subject to monetary penalties (up to $54,000 in 
one case, but with the vast majority under $2000), and 24 were subject to 
a two-year ban on hiring migrant workers.84 
Two of the penalized employers are farms, one of which appealed, 
giving rise to the only judicial consideration of this regulatory system 
so far. In the Farms case, a federal investigator found Obeid Farms in 
breach of multiple requirements, including failure to pay workers on a 
timely basis and to provide a rest period, improper deductions, and failing 
to make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace free of abuse.85 The 
employer argued that the pay and working hours breaches were justi? ed 
because they arose from unintentional administrative errors.86 The Court 
80. Ibid, s 196.2. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Canadian Agricultural Human Resource Council, A Review of Canada’s Seasonal Agriculture 
Worker Program (Ottawa: CAHRC, 2017), online (pdf): <cahrc-ccrha.ca/sites/default/? les/Emerging-
Issues-Research/A%20Review%20of%20Canada%27s%20SAWP-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/G8XD-
XFLS].
83. IRPR, supra note 72, Schedule 2.
84. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Employers Who Have Been Non-compliant” 
(2008), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/
employers-non-compliant.html> [perma.cc/FD63-GVLH].
85. Farms v Canada (Employment and Social Development), 2017 FC 302 [Farms].
86. IRPR, supra note 72, ss 203(1.1), 209.3(3)-(4).
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be considered in interpreting the new rules. The new enforcement 
system responds only partially to Vosko’s critique of compliance-based 
mechanisms: it still proceeds on the basic assumption that non-compliance 
is exceptional and provides the potential for defences on the basis of 
unintentional breaches; in fact, the regulation itself makes clear that the 
intention of these changes is “to encourage compliance with the provisions 
of the Act and these Regulations and not to punish.”90 Many of the actual 
? nancial penalties have been small and may not deter. The new system 
relies in part on evidence and reports from workers, whose deportability 
may render them reluctant to disclose employer wrongdoing. 
On the other hand, strict limits on employer defences, unannounced 
inspections independent of worker complaint, and potentially heavy 
penalties may act as deterrent features, notwithstanding the fact that this 
is fundamentally a compliance model. Only further experience will show 
whether there is a deterrent effect, or whether employers integrate this as 
part of the cost of doing business, outweighed by the bene? ts of ? exible 
migrant labour. As I have argued elsewhere, this enforcement system also 
fails to take adequate account of the particular vulnerabilities inherent in 
the relationship between migrant workers and their employers.91 In this 
way, the burden of enforcement still rests unduly on the workers, and this, 
too contributes to the justice gap. As is the case with rights, the gesture 
of protection ? gures heavily in both legislative provisions and the single 
instance of judicial consideration. While this may mean gains in working 
conditions on some farms, like individual employment rights, it does 
nothing to challenge the sources of worker vulnerability that give rise to 
the very problems it purports to address. Further research is required to 
determine whether the penalties have a deterrent effect on employers, as 
well to measure the actual impact of these regulations on workers. And 
perhaps most importantly, the legal constructs giving rise to temporariness, 
deportability, and labour immobility remain unchallenged in the new rules, 
limiting their potential to address the justice gap for migrant workers. 
 IV.? ?????????????????????????????
In the foregoing sections, I have set out a few immediately visible forms 
of law as they concern migrant farmworkers. There is an obvious tension 
between ??? ???? rights inclusion and employer compliance regimes 
on the one hand, and immigration law’s categorical subordination of 
migrant agricultural workers on the other. The rights gesture is important 
90. ????, ????? note 72,?s?209.94.
91. Sarah Marsden, “Who Bears the Burden of Enforcement?” (forthcoming, Canadian Lab & Emp 
LJ, 2019).
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in Canada, as in any liberal democracy, but legal rights do not serve as 
a mechanism for change on a large scale for migrant workers; at best, 
rights-based remedies can take note of the underlying conditions, but they 
do not pose an effective challenge to those conditions or the role of law 
and state in creating them. The material conditions of migrant workers are 
cemented by federal immigration law and policy that create and maintain 
unfreedom through temporariness, deportability, and labour immobility. 
In the words of Adrian Smith, if we wish to contest the subordination 
of migrant workers, “the task here is to push beyond general recognition 
of the existence of unfree labour to address the speci? c mechanisms of 
incorporation deployed by participating capitalist states.”92 The ?????????
denial of rights occurs on the basis of institutional arrangements backed 
by law and policy which are not within the ambit of individual rights or 
employer sanctions. Rights and sanctions are in effect a concession to 
workers in a system in which deportability, temporariness, and labour 
immobility, of which contribute to labour unfreedom for migrant workers, 
are considered to be unchangeable and necessary features of labour 
migration in Canada’s economy.
Recent labour scholarship rejects the idea of free/unfree labour as a 
strict binary, characterizing it instead as a spectrum.93 Genevieve LeBaron 
situates increasing labour unfreedom as an aspect of deepening neoliberal 
policy on a global scale, and notes the concentration of unfree labour 
in migrant populations.94 Judy Fudge argues that traditional Marxist 
and liberal theory has underestimated the role of law in shaping forms 
of unfreedom, and cautions against seeing labour unfreedom as the 
result of individual culpability but instead understanding it as the result 
of “systemic and institutional features of state policies and practices 
relating to immigration and labour regulation combined with the ‘free 
market’ behaviour of employers.”95 While the underlying structures 
remain unchallenged, the justice gap between the promise of rights and 
sanctions and their limitations will not be closed by more individual rights, 
better access to existing rights, or more sanctions. Rather the justice gap 
signals the need to challenge this naturalization of labour unfreedom 
and the speci? c legal and institutional forms it takes in Canada. Beyond 
documenting the limits of legal remedies, I am interested in holding law 
(and the state) accountable for the subordination of migrant workers 
92. Smith, ??????note 33 at 29.
93. See, e.g., Lebaron, ??????note 35; Judy Fudge, “Modern Slavery, Unfree Labour and the Labour 
Market: The Social Dynamics of Legal Characterization” (2018) 27:4 Social & Leg Studies 414.
94. Lebaron, ??????note 35 at 12.
95. Fudge, ????? note 93.
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and understanding how the present institutional arrangements might be 
challenged. Rather than framing this accountability in terms of failing to 
extend the same rights to all workers, I suggest that we must go one step 
further and hold law accountable as a mechanism for labour unfreedom, 
which forms the underlying basis for the relative impotence of rights. The 
ways of doing so might include both those that address the state directly, 
and those which seek justice beyond or outside the state.96 In either case, 
I proceed on the basis that justice requires more than the redistribution 
of resources (or rights), but must provide reprieve from oppression, with 
the latter understood broadly in terms of exploitation, marginalization, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.97 These are amply 
documented in the case of migrant workers, and as results of the SAWP 
program in particular. I propose that any potential response to the justice 
gap, whether addressed to the state or otherwise, should be measured in 
terms of its potential to facilitate change in institutional arrangements 
such as to remove structurally-based oppression. Here it is not possible to 
interrogate all options, but I start with a principle whose value is uncontested 
from the state perspective, namely the rule of law. I hope to move from 
a critique of the failure of rights to an understanding of law’s potential, 
or lack of potential, in fashioning meaningful responses to inequality, 
with the assumption that in order to be meaningful, such responses must 
have real potential to re? gure the underlying institutional arrangements 
through which labour unfreedom is generated. In this paper, I ? rst consider 
whether rule of law arguments can form the basis for robust critique and a 
shift in the underlying institutional arrangements through which the state 
regulates the work and lives of migrant agricultural workers. I conclude 
that rule of law arguments provide an incomplete response to the justice 
gap with regard to the regulation of migrant workers, and brie? y canvass 
non-state-facing forms of action as alternative, and potentially more 
potent, responses.
96. Here I have not addressed the potential of international law, but with regard to the rights of 
migrant workers it is likely to be quite limited; while the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and 
Regulations must be applied in a way that “complies with international human rights instruments to 
which Canada is signatory” (IRPA, supra note 72, s 3(3)(f). See also de Guzman v Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 436. Canada has not signed the most relevant treaty: the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families. For a detailed treatment of the potential of international law’s application to migrant 
workers in Canada, see, e.g., Judy Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: 
The Paradox of International Rights for Migrant Workers” (2011) Metropolis Working Paper Series, 
online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1958360> [perma.cc/DR3X-PC77].
97. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 
1990) at 64.
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Do the contradictions between the promises of individual rights ???
???? and their??????????preclusion through the legal structuring of labour 
unfreedom amount to a rule of law problem? Without wading too far into 
the rich debates on the appropriate de? nition of the rule of law, it can be 
understood in a thin or strictly formal sense in which the legal system 
meets certain criteria, regardless of the content of the laws themselves. 
Such criteria might include clarity, stability, the creation of laws through 
properly authorized means, the subjection of all individuals and the state to 
the power of law, and the availability of court review.98 In a similar vein, Lon 
Fuller enumerated the requisite eight features to govern good lawmaking 
(which he characterized as procedural, but some view as substantive),99
namely: generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, feasibility, constancy, 
prospectivity, and congruence. The requirements of the rule of law can 
also be understood in a thicker, more overtly substantive sense, either by 
requiring that positive law recognize certain rights100 or through features 
that are said to be intrinsic to the functioning of law such as justice, 
equality, or fairness. The latter position does not necessarily dictate the 
content of the law, although it does acknowledge “abstract substantive 
values” at its core.101 
Audrey Macklin notes that because the rule of law is determined by 
jurisdiction, and not citizenship, its reach extends to non-citizens subject 
to Canadian law (or the relevant law in any national jurisdiction), but that 
there are nonetheless observable “distortions” in the rule of law in the case 
of non-citizens.102 Macklin’s analysis identi? es two “constitutive features 
of contemporary sovereignty” that are key to understanding the relative 
weakening of the rule of law with regard to non-citizens: territoriality 
and status.103 Macklin focuses to a large degree on interactions at the 
territorial border; for example, she documents the RCMP’s recent actions 
in interrogating would-be refugee claimants, including on the basis of 
religious practices and political activity. This expression of discretionary 
authority at the physical border is founded on the state’s power to refuse 
admission to non-citizens, to attach “what conditions it pleases” to the 
98. Paul P Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework” (1997) Public?L 467 at 468.
99. David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Re-examining Fuller’s Canons” (2010) 2 
Hague Jl on the Rule of Law, 29 at 31.
100. Craig, ??????note 98 at 473.
101. ?????at 477.
102. Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship, Non-Citizenship and the Rule of Law” (2018) 69:1 UNBLJ 
(2018) 19 at 22.
103. ???? at 55.
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entry of non-citizens, and to remove non-citizens at will.104 In essence, 
the state’s expression of control over non-citizens in terms of entry to and 
presence in Canada tends to erode the rule of law insofar as it justi? es 
uses of discretion that would not be acceptable in the case of non-citizens. 
Actions by state of? cials that seem arbitrary or have no statutory basis 
(such as the questioning of refugee claimants as to their feelings about 
women who do not cover their heads, and other clearly Islamophobic 
questions) demonstrate not an “outright negation” of the rule of law 
with regard to non-citizens, but rather situations in which the rule of 
law becomes less potent. This is underpinned by a narrowing of review 
potential, which, in Macklin’s view, falls short of the requirements of the 
rule of law in terms of the susceptibility of state actions to review under 
law. This is so because while a non-citizen can apply for judicial review 
of any decision under immigration law, they require leave from the court 
to do so; Macklin argues that this leaves the process subject to a “culture 
of suspicion” amongst judges with regard to the merit of claims, and does 
not satisfy the basic requirement of reviewability.105 
While Macklin focuses in large part on examples from the operation 
of the physical border, the same analysis applies with regard to non-
citizens within Canada. While they have already entered Canada, both 
status and territoriality justify distinct forms of discretion that, as at the 
border, are founded on the expression of sovereignty through ultimate 
control over the conditions applied to non-citizens’ presence in Canada, 
and underpinned by the state’s authority to deport. The argument here is 
not that the state should not issue conditions or have the authority to deport 
(although this premise is corollary to the more assertive forms of open 
borders arguments), but rather that the rule of law tends to be less potent 
in the same sites in which the state exercises control over membership, 
either at the border or inside Canada. Exclusion of non-citizens does not 
occur only at the territorial border. This is consistent with the work of 
Bridget Anderson (among others)106 who argue that borders also exist 
within the state, by way of social, legal, and physical exclusion. Migrant 
agricultural workers in Canada are included in most individual rights, 
but excluded as members in other ways through their legal status as 
104. ?????
105. ???? at 26.
106. Bridget Anderson, ????????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Gabriel Popescu,?????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little? eld, 2011); Sandro Mezzadra & 
Brett Neilson, ??????? ??????????? ???? ??????????????????? ??? ????? (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2013).
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temporary migrant workers in terms of deportability, limited-term status, 
and labour immobility. Physically, they also are segregated: this ? ows 
from a requirement in the SAWP contract for workers to reside on the 
farm or otherwise as determined by the employer, in employer-provided 
housing. They live apart from nearby cities or towns, often without 
transportation, and in some cases are actually disallowed from leaving the 
farm.107 Sequestered on a private farm, or otherwise on employer-owned 
private property, these workers are separated from public space and public 
life, but also from public goods such as access to healthcare.108 Macklin’s 
argument could also be applied to argue that the exclusion of this group 
of migrant workers from Canadian society is suf? ciently complete as to 
function as a border within the state. Macklin’s point about reviewability 
applies as well; the discretionary power that governs non-citizens inside 
Canada ? ows from the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, in which 
reviewability is limited by the narrow gate of judicial leave requirement. 
I suggest that the case of migrant agricultural workers provides the 
strongest example of the diminishment of the rule of law with regard to 
non-citizens inside Canada. The de jure inclusion of migrant agricultural 
workers in individual rights on par with all workers would seem to point 
away from a rule of law problem at ? rst, the problem (with few exceptions) 
is not that employment standards and similar laws do not apply to migrant 
agricultural workers. By and large, they do, and as I describe above, 
there seems to be increasing state interest in establishing and enforcing 
sanctions against abusive employers. But the barriers to legal remedy for 
these workers are themselves established through law, as well; the law 
requires these workers to remain in a state of temporariness, deportability, 
and labour immobility; perpetual “privilege-holders” rather than full legal 
subjects.109 Are these institutional arrangements susceptible to critique due 
to the diminishment of the rule of law? 
If by “temporariness” one means simply the authorization to remain 
in Canada for a speci? ed period and the requirement to leave at the end 
of that period, it most likely does not diminish the rule of law: this is a 
discretionary decision made within a legal framework issuing permission 
107. See, e.g., Amy Cohen, “’Slavery Hasn’t Ended, It Has Just Become Modernized’: Border 
Imperialism and the Lived Realities of Migrant Farmworkers in British Columbia, Canada” (2017) 
Acme: An Intl J for Critical Geographies, online (pdf): <www.acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/
article/view/1430/1308> [perma.cc/TWX6-LE9S].
108. See, e.g., Horgan & Liinamaa, supra note 62. See also Amy Cohen & Susana Caxaj, “Bodies 
and Borders: Migrant Women Farmworkers and the Struggle for Sexual and Reproductive Justice in 
British Columbia, Canada” (2018) 29 Alternate Routes 90, online: <www.alternateroutes.ca/index.
php/ar/article/view/22448> [perma.cc/S9CX-ETSC].
109. Macklin, supra note 102 at 56.
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discretion is further enlarged; the premise of free labour circulation that is 
assumed in the standard allocation of rights and obligations to workers and 
employers is obviated in the case of migrant workers.
The justice gap for migrant workers does not arise from the failure 
to include them ??????? in basic rights accorded to all workers, but rather 
from the contingency of their ability to live and work Canada, and the 
strict limitation of labour mobility, in combination with the powerful role 
of employers’ unilateral and unchecked discretion in the application of 
state power. In a formalistic conception of the rule of law, let us say that an 
exercise of discretionary authority is consistent with the rule of law where 
it is legally authorized, subject to rules about the fair exercise of authority, 
and made accountable to on this basis in a manner to which the legal subject 
has access, whether through judicial review or otherwise. The regulation 
of migrant workers in Canada, and agricultural workers most obviously, 
creates a problem even in this thin understanding of the rule of law: 
although the role of employers is authorized by law, employer discretion is 
the lynchpin of the legal regulation of workers, and employers’ discretion 
is not reviewable in any manner nor subject to rules about the fair exercise 
of authority. In a more substantive understanding, the mechanisms through 
which employer discretion becomes paramount could also be critiqued on 
the basis of a lack of consistent application of the law, because the creation 
of a separate, lower stratum of workers for whom the heightened risks 
inherent in seeking redress effectively precludes consistent application of 
employment and human rights laws clearly intended to cover all workers.
If this argument is correct, what would the rule of law require? At 
the minimum, one would expect any exercise of employer discretion 
that has an impact on the immigration status of workers to be subject to 
control and review, including review mechanisms available to workers. In 
a substantive understanding of the rule of law, this may not be satisfying 
—if workers remain temporary, deportable, and immobile in the labour 
market, any remedy to which they have access will be limited by these 
features. On the “thickest” end of the spectrum, if migrant workers were 
provided with open permits or permanent residence upon arrival, the 
justice gap would almost certainly be reduced, if not closed. Workers or 
worker collectives could be given a meaningful role in the negotiation of 
the bilateral agreement, worker contracts, or the terms on which labour 
is available. Similarly, the removal of employers’ control of workers’ 
housing, the removal of unilateral employer power to determine recall and 
replacement, and recourse in Canadian law for workers whose status has 
been impacted by employers or consulates would all assist in closing the 
justice gap. But in a system in which the law itself is formulated to provide 
???????? ???????????????????????????????????? ???
access to ? exible labour in response to a market in which unfree labour 
has long been a component, a rule of law argument is unlikely to garner 
these material gains and institutional changes for workers, although it may 
be useful in advocating for procedural improvements. What seems likely 
instead is that the legal system will continue to respond to critiques of rights 
shortfalls with measures such as the new federal enforcement regime, and 
other compliance-based requirements for employers, such as the Ontario 
Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act and British Columbia’s 
recently enacted Temporary Foreign Worker Protection Act (TFWPA). All 
of these provide heightened requirements for employers in terms speci? c 
to the vulnerabilities migrant workers face; the TFWPA, for example, 
forbids employers from threatening deportation or misrepresenting a 
position, and requires employers of temporary foreign workers to register 
with the Employment Standards Branch.112 While these may all provide 
further remedies for migrant workers, they do not aim to resolve any of 
the underlying institutional arrangements in which their unfreedom is 
generated and maintained. It cannot be seen as suf? cient for justice for the 
state to naturalize unfree labour, imbed it in law, and then offer individual 
rights de jure and retrospective compliance measures to take the edge off 
and/or to promote surface or formal equality. 
If a rule of law argument provides at best a partial and unsatisfying 
response to the justice gap for migrant workers, and recent statutory 
changes provide concessionary remedies, rather than institutional change, 
how should the justice gap be addressed? Justice, whether de? ned 
redistributively or as action toward ending oppression, is broader than 
the law, and power is negotiated both within and outside the bounds set 
through the state’s mediation of relationships. Justice might well be met 
through collective and individual worker-initiated acts of resistance and 
change outside, and sometimes against, the dictates of law. Cohen and 
Hjalmarson, for example, document multiple forms of everyday resistance 
by farmworkers including working beyond the ambit of the work permit, 
collective actions to pace work to manage employers’ expectations, adding 
hours on timesheets to account for work done outside of regular hours, and 
112. Bill 48 – 2018, Temporary Foreign Worker Protection Act, 3rd Sess, 41st Parl, British Columbia, 
2018, ss 10, 20(c), 20(d).
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reappropriation of farm produce.113 They connect these types of worker 
actions with the history of quiet resistance: acts undertaken against, or 
around, structural constraints where overt resistance is impossible or 
too risky. Collective action outside the scope of legally regulated labour 
relations (such a general strike) would be a more overt version of the 
same. In a less confrontational vein, this might include changes to non-
state relationships such as those between consumers and suppliers through 
supply chain accountability and consumer awareness.114 Other forms of 
collective action include grassroots organizing,115 and acts of resistance and 
collective voice through art and culture.116 The demands for institutional 
change, especially in the form of open or sectoral work permits and 
permanent residence, continue to be sounded by frontline activists and 
academics alike, but the law’s response never questions the naturalization 
of ? exible, differentiated, immobile, and “temporary” labour, nor does 
it become accountable for the material effects of this. Perhaps the most 
satisfactory answers to the justice gap may be those in which migrant 
workers exercise freedom not only in terms of labour mobility, but in terms 
of the capacity to negotiate, confront, or avoid the institutional structures 
that entrench oppressive conditions, and in which both workers’ allies and 
the law are measured by their relationship to this struggle.
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